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to stimulate discussion and critical comment. References in
publications to Discussion Papers should be cleared with the
author to protect the tentative character of these papers. 
I 
"Finance, Capital Harkets and Economic Growth in Japan"* 
by 
Hugh T. Patrick 
Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of financial inter­
mediation during the course of Japan's postwar economic growth, The main 
focus is upon the sources of finance of the private corporate sector, and 
particularly the role of domestic capital markets. It will be shown that 
external finance has been extremely important, especially for large firms, 
but that the new issue of stocks and bonds has been relatively unimportant. 
explain why Japan's capital markets remain underdeveloped in what is 
otherwise a highly developed, variegated, and reasonably sophisticated finan­
cial system, and suggest some broad conclusions as to whether capital mar­
ket underdevelopment has really had a seriously adverse impact. 
The time period covered is from the early 1950's until mid-1969. The 
Allied Occupation of Japan formally ended in April, 1952. By 1953 the 
rapid inflation of early posti-,ar, renewed by the Korean War, had come to 
an end, and wholesale price stability has continued since. By 1954 the 
reconstruction phase was completed, in that prewar levels of per capita 
income and productivity levels had been re-attained (after some 18 years). 
Moreover, the data are better from the early 1950's. I place somewhat 
* This research was financed by a Fulbright-Hays Center Faculty Fellowship 
and a Yale University Concilium on International Studies grant for research 
in Japan in 1968-69. Huch of the information, particularly on the stock 
and bond markets, came from interviews with specialists at a variety of 
financial institutions; they prefer to remain anonymous, but I wish to 
express here my thanks for their assistance. 
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greater emphasis on the more recent past in order to appraise the future 
development of Japan's capital markets. 
Economic Growth and the Importance of Financial Intermediation 
Japan's postwar economic performance has been spectacular and unpre­
cedented, bringing it to the forefront of the world's major industrial 
1nations. Between 1952-1967 real GNP grew at a 9.6 percent average annual 
2rate; in 1968 and 1969 the grm·Jth rate was somewhat higher. Ci-JP in 1968 
was $141.9 billion (current prices at the official exchange rate parity); 
it will reach $200 billion in 1970. 
Explanation of the causes of such rapid r;rowth is not the story to be 
told here. In brief the major factors include: a high rate of invest­
ment in plant and equipment and related infrastructure, spurred on by self­
generating entrepreneurial optimism and rapid growth of gross domestic 
saving; an unprecedented degree of technological absorption (mainly from 
the United States), innovation, and diffusion; an ample supply of well­
trained and highly motivated labor; and a strong export performance to 
pay for the raw material and other imports essential to stoke the engine 
of industrial growth. 
1 
.sy 1968 Japan ranked third in GNP (though still quite far behind 
the United States and the USSR, and only somewhat ahead of West Germany) 
yet only approximately 13th in GNP/capita, at $1400 at the official ex­
change rate of ¥360 = $1. For a brief review of Japan's economic perfor­
mance see Hugh T. Patrick, "The Phoenix Risen from the Ashes: Postwar 
Japan," in James ll. Crowley, ed., Hodern East Asia: Essays in Interpreta­
tion (New York: Harcourt, l$race and World, Inc., 1970). 
2 
-- This and following data are in real terms based on the newly re­
vised national accounts which are in 1965 constant prices. See Japan, 
Economic Planning Agency, Revised Report on ilational Income Statistics, 
1951-1967 (August 1969) and for more recent data Bank of Japan, Statis­
tics Department, Economic Statistics Honthly. 
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Fixed investment i1as gro,;-m particularly rapidly--at a 15.4 percent 
annual rate for the private sector between 1952-1967, and 13.3 percent 
for the government. As a consequence the proportion of fixed investment 
in GNP has risen from just under 20 percent in the early 1950 1s to more 
than 30 percent during the 1960's (35.0 percent in 1968). While the 
government share in GIJP has increased (from 5.2 percent in 1952 to 8.7 
percent in 1963), the private sector share has grown even more--from 12.1 
to 26.3 percent. Thus, most investment has been done by the private 
sector, and that mainly by corporate business (see Table 1). In the com­
petition for investible resources the government's basic policy has been 
to defer somewhat to private business investment demand and to gear its 
expenditures to transportation, communications and other facilities com­
plementary to private investment. As a consequence, the provision of 
public services has lagged; the widening gap between the relative supplies 
of private and public consumption goods has been enhanced by the rapid 
rate of urbanization (two-thirds of Japan's population now live in cities). 
Housing supply has continuously lagged behind demand since the destruc­
tion of World Oar II, though investment in housing has finally acceler­
ated in the past few years. An important cause of this lag is that 
financial institutions 11ave not provided much housing credit, lending 
instead to business. 
Concommitant with the growth in investment has been a matching in­
crease in gross domestic saving (Table 1). Nost striking has been the 
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Table l (contiuu(~d) 
Cor·;)oratc :?crso!l,:l (;ovcrt1 !~i!,~t FL:ancial Total ::.ouer;tic 
:,ector Sector Sector Sector Econom~ 
tn Indirect Clait s 17,683.7 34,850.6 3,742.3 ?.,672.8 65,949.4 
i.;oney 5,925.3 6,777.5 335.6 525.0 13,564.9 
Time a1d S.:ving Deposits 3,417.6 17,411.2 47).6 212.2 26,520.6 
Trust 736.2 2,237.3 2 3.1 143.8 3,145.4 
Insurance 0 4,,975.3 ) 0 4,975.3 
r,ank Londs 271.2 1,294.3 ) 2,269.4 3,G34.S 
SecuritieQ Investment Trust 17.C 7J5. 8 J 51.3 864.9 
Stock and Equity in Financial 
Ir,..,t:itutions 339.) 444.C 31,j. 6 0 1,10,J.5 
Ot1'.er 1,975.2 '.315.2 2,5131_.4 6,471.1 11,942.S' 
1'otal 99,024.3 SS,115.9 T) ,46(). 'f G7,442.4 256,052.5 
1iscrepancy Sourcef - Use~; 1,110.6 -~832. 7 ~1'.)2 •.) G3.3 L333.2 i 
V, 
I 
I/ote ;: Primary dsset s differ from primary liatilities ½y the difference in forei~n loans, since the rest ··of 
the--worl<l sector is exclu<led ·· similarly savin:a; differs from invest:,i_ent, due also to statistical 
discrep,:i11cieE in estimation. 
~ource. t~ugL T. Fat rick, · Financial Intermediation in Japan,·· Seventh Zushi Conference, January 1969 
(forthcornir g in Japanese), Yale ::::conornic Growth Center Discussi-:m Paper 1Jo. 70 (July 31, 1969); 
,aL·ccgrap:-.e d. 
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19.7 percent in 1968). 
1 The corporate sector has a high retention rate out 
2
of net profits; as the profit share in national income has increased so 
has corporate net saving. The government has also been a significant saver­
3 
(defined as the excess of current revenues over current expenditures). 
An important characteristic of the Japanese economy is that the per­
sonal sector has engaged in saving far in excess of its investment expendi­
tures and has desired to hold financial assets, while the corporate sector 
has invested far more than it has saved, as well as holding financial assets. 
These relationships are made clear in Table 1. Table 1 presents an aggre­
gative cumulation of saving, investment, and net financial flows between 
1954 and 1967 for the three domestic spendinr, sectors (corporate, personal, 
and government) and the domestic financial sector (which for purposes of 
simplification is assumed to do no saving and investment) including govern­
ment tinancial institutions. I divide financial claims into primary and 
and indirect assets and liabilities, using the standard Gurley-Shaw termi­
4
nology and classification. 
1
The personal sector is a heterogeneous mix of wage earners, profes­
sionals, farmers, and unincorporated business. Survey data indicate that 
the urban worker saving rate has risen to about 20 percent of disposable 
income. 
2
The average saving rate for the corporate sector as a whole for 1965-
67 was 78 percent; this is somewhat high because smaller companies are 
able to underreport profits and thereby to evade taxation. 
3
Simple regressions of saving on income (annual data, 1951-1967) 
provide the following estimates of the marginal propensity to save: per­
sonal sector, 19.8 percent; corporate sector, 79.6 percent; government 
R2sector, 31.1 percent. In all three regressions is high but the 
Durbin-Watson statistic is unsatisfactorily low. 
4
Primary claims are the external sources of funds (liabilities) of 
spending units such as loans, stock, and bond issue, and trade credit; 
indirect securities are the liabilities of financial institutions, such 
as money, time deposits, and insurance reserves. 
The data in Table 1 suggest a number of aggregative financial relation­
ships which characterize the Japanese economy, notably regarding the 
relative importance of alternative sources of financing for the three 
1spending sectors over the period 1954-1967. 
First, the degree of reliance on financial intermediation and external 
finance has been great. The net increase in all primary debt between 1954-
1967 equalled the cumulated gross investment for the period. This is a 
2high ratio as compared with other countries. Similarly, in stock terms 
Japan has a high rat:i.o of primary securities to real national wealth. The 
financial interrelations ratio (the ratio of all financial assets--both 
primary and indirect securities--to real national wealth) is also very 
large, at a level shared only by England (a legacy of government war debt) 
and Switzerland (as international financial intermediary). About 70 per-
cent of the Japanese primary debt was issued by corporate business, and 
only slightly over 10 percent by the government sector. 
Second, in contrast to the overall importance of finance, the capital 
issue markets have played a relatively minor role. Only 16 percent of 
primary security issue was in stock (seven percent) and bonds (nine per-
3cent). Of this 2.8 percentage points were sold directly to other spend-
ing units without going through capital markets. Examples include 
1
The following discussion is derived from Patrick, "Financial Inter­
mediation in Japan" cited in Table 1. 
2
For international comparisons see Raymond H. Goldsmith, The Deter­
minants of Financial Structure, (Paris: OECD, Development Centre, 1966), 
and his Financial Structure and Development (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1969). 
3
Stock has been valued in the data at issue price rather than subse-
quent market value because this represents the funds which issuing cor­
porations received and buyers paid. 
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central government purchase of local government and government corporation 
bonds, and the required purchase of Japan Telephone and Telegraph Company and 
Japan National Railway Company bonds by corporate and personal customers, 
and corporate purchase of shares in their subsidiaries and related firms. 
Another 3.3 percentage points were purchased directly through the capital 
markets by individuals and other spending units; almost all (87) percent of 
this was newly-issued stock. Thus, the predominant portion (9.9 percentage 
points) of stock and bond issue was bought by financial intermediaries, and 
then not always willingly. 
Third, of the three avenues of external financing--direct financial 
transactions between deficit and surplus spendinz units, transactions between 
spending units via the capital markets, and intermediation by financial in­
stitutions which buy primary liabilities (make loans, etc.) and sell their 
indirect liabilities (create deposits, etc.)--financial intermediation has 
been dominant. Financial institutions provided 63 percent of all external 
funds obtained (primary securities issued) by spending units. As noted 
above, only 3.3 percent of external finance flowed through capital market 
transactions among spending units. Direct transactions among spending units 
accounted for the remaining 33.7 percent; almost all has been inter-business 
trade credit. Financial institutions paid for their acquisition of primary 
(and indirect) assets with their own indirect liabilities. About one-fifth 
of the increase in financial system liabilities consisted of money, and 
another two-fifths of time and savings deposits; insurance, 7.6 percent of 
the total increase, was in third place. Layering (the proportion of total 
indirect claims held by financial intermediaries themselves) has not been 
-9-
great; the measured rate of 14.6 percent is a slight underestimate because 
certain financial transactions among financial institutions cannot be ad­
justed in the flow-of-funds data from a net to a gross basis. 
Fourth, the foreign sector has been unimportant either as a source of 
financing of domestic investment or as a use of domestic saving. The small 
influence of foreign financing holds for each of the spending sectors, and 
for the financial sector as well. This is not inconsistent with the view 
that foreign borrowing has been important for Japan's postwar growth by easing 
the balance of payments constraint, or significant for certain firms or in­
dustries. 
Fifth, the taxation method of accumulating saving has been of some 
importance, accounting for almost one-fifth of gross saving and almost one­
third of net saving. While substantial, these ratios are not unusual; for 
example, they are higher in France and West Germany. The presumption is 
that government saving has been used virtually entirely to finance government 
investment--in large part directly but to some extent also by the transfer of 
government sector saving to government financial institutions to be relent 
to government sector institutions. Typically, the central government saves 
enough to finance more than its own investment, transferring the remainder 
by a bewildering variety of routes to finance (most of) the excess investment 
of local governments and public corporations. Thus the taxation mechanism 
has financed about four-fifths of government sector investment, but none of 
the economy's private investment. Rather, government financial institutions 
(part of the financial sector) issued indirect liabilities (mostly postal 
savings and life insurance) to private spending sectors, and lent to all 
three spending sectors. 
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Sixth, self-finance by capital consumption allowances has been sub­
stantial, amounting to one-third of gross investment (and gross savine) 
for the economy as a whole and to more than 40 percent of the corporate 
sector's gross investment. As in the United States and West Germany, Japan­
ese corporate depreciation is almost double its retained profits. Though 
capital consumption allowances were about the same proportion of GNP in 
the early 1950's as in the United States, the ratio in Japan has subse­
quently increased substantially (from 7.0 percent of GNP in 1952 to 12.8 
percent in 1968). While Japan's depreciation laws are somewhat more lenient 
than in the United States, the main reason for the increase in the ratio has 
been the continuing surge of fixed investment. 
Seventh, trade credit has been large--30 percent of total primary 
security issue and 33 percent of corporate sector borrowing. Significantly, 
more than 2 1/2 times as great as corporatethe increase in trade credit was 
investment in inventories (and a substantially larger multiple in the per­
sonal sector, mainly that of unincorporated business). Trade credit has 
been used in Japan not simply to finance inventories, but also for fi~ed 
investment and the increase in financial assets. 
One of the most important features of Japan's financial system is 
that it is a disequilibrium system: in most financial markets demand is 
greater than supply at the given interest rates. Essentially, a structure 
of interest rates has been imposed by the monetary authorities (the Minis­
try of Finance and the Bank of Japan), supported on the whole by the 
oligopolistic larger financial institutions. This structure of rates has 
usually been below that which would have resulted solely from market forces, 
-11-
particularly in periods of monetary restriction. Underlying this has been 
the tendency in Japan's rapid-growth economy for ex ante investment to be 
greater than ex ante saving. Hence, at the given interest rates financial 
institutions cannot b')rrow as much as they want from (surplus) spending 
units; similarly most investors (deficit spending units) cannot borrow as 
much as they want from financial institutions. 
Not only has the interest rate structure been set by the monetary 
authorities, the structure has been extremely inflexible. This is demon­
1strated in Table 2. Long-term interest rates have been particularly in­
flexible in Japan, but even short-term rates have not moved greatly despite 
wide cyclical fluctuation in economic growth and in the relative supplies 
of and demands for various types of credit. The administered, inflexible 
control over the interest rate structure in the bond market is particularly 
strong,. as discussed later. The one exception has been call money rates, 
2which have been determined primarily by market forces. Except for brief 
occasions of extreme monetary ease, call rates have never b~en below the 
issue yield on long-term government bonds, and have usually been above the 
yields on new corporate bond issues. 
There is some market-determined flexibility in effective interest 
rates on private loans, but not sufficient to equilibrate demand with supply 
1The coefficients of variance would be even larger for the United 
States, United Kingdom, and West Germany if the general increases in rates 
in 1968-69 were included in the data. 
2
At times, notably in the 1967-68 monetary restriction, the Bank of 
Japan has put direct, if informal, pressure on participants in the call 
market not to allow the call rr,te to rise too much. 
---
Table 2 
International Comparison of Flexibility of I1terest Rates 
(end of 1967, in percentage points) 
U1ited Kingdom West GermanyJaEan United States 
Actual Degree of Actual Degree of Actual Degree of Actual Degree of 
Rate FluctuationRate Fluctuation Rate Fluctuation Rite Fluctuation 
3.00 0.205Official Disccunt Rate 5.84 0.061 4.50 0.135 3.00 0.182 
Short-te1,n Government 
2.75 0.304Securities 5.66 0.023 5.01 0.198 7.56 0.199 
Call Loney Rates 8.03 0.302 4.51 0.215 6.88 0.231 2.44 0.263 I .....
0.297 4.00 0.134 NDeposit Rates 5.50 0.025 5.00 0.083 6.00 I 
0.110Lending :!:.ates 5.84 0.060 6.00 0.088 7.00 0.080 6.00 
Long·-term Gov£ rnment 
:3ond YieldE 6. 80. 0.015 5.36 0.060 7.13 0.059 6.80 0.073 
7.93 0.047 7.10 0.098Industrial Bord Yields 7.49 0.015 6.51 0.077 
Note; Degree of fluctuation is measured by the coefficient of variance, using quarter end data for 1958~1967. 
Economic Survey of Japan, 1967·1963 (Tokyo; Japan Times, 1968), p. 163.Source; Japar, Economic Planning Agency, 
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completely except perhaps in very easy money periods. Haxiraum legal 
interest rates on loans determine the actual nominal rates, which are main-
tained by cartel arrangements through national bank associations. These rates 
move in small amounts with changes in the Bank of Japan discount rate, insuf-­
ficient to give much flexibility to nominal loan interest rates. The greater 
flexibility of effective interest rates on loans derives from the widespread 
commercial bank use of required compensatory deposits by borrowers. Except 
for prime customers (mainly selected large companies) which probably are able 
to obtain as much funds as they demand at prevailing interest rates, most 
customers want to borrow even more than they can at effective interest rates. 
Compensatory deposit ratios probably do not increase effective interest costs 
1
sufficiently to restrict demand to the level of supply. 
Since the price mechanism does not clear most financial markets, the 
system relies importantly on credit rationing; for many types of financial 
claims it is availability rather than the interest rate which determines the 
allocation of credit. The relative importance of credit rationing versus 
market (flexible interest rate) mechanisms for determining the flow of funds 
varies by type of financial claim. Hore importantly, it varies with the 
degree of creditworthiness of the borrower. Credit rationing systems, where 
financial institutions are allowed to select their borrowers, inevitably 
work to the advantage of the largest borrowers as default risk and transac­
tions costs are minimized. That this is the case in Japan is indicated in 
a following sector. 
1This is true despite high (25-35 percent) compensatory deposit balance 
requirements for small firms. A number of such grey market practices have 
inevitably developed in various financial markets, but they are not suf­
ficiently large or widespread to achieve equilibrium. See Hugh T. Patrick, 
11 lnterest Rates and the Grey Financial Market in Japan," Pacific Affairs, 
Winter 1965-66. 
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Sources of Corporate Finance 
As already discussed, the main function of Japan's financial system has 
been to finance the corporate sector. The availability of external finance 
has been very important for the realization of corporate investment plans. 
Even if we make the extreme assumption that all depreciation allowances and 
all retained profits have been used solely to finance investment (rather than 
meeting liquidity and other financial needs), at a minimum 57.6 percent of 
corporate net investment and 33.3 percent of gross investment between 1954-1967 
was financed from external sources. 
1 The corporate degree of reliance on 
external finance is larger than West Germany and England, and substantially 
greater than in the United States. 
cor-Two factors predominate in the explanation of this high degree of 
porate reliance on external finance. First, despite the partial revaluation 
of assets following the early postwar inflation, most firms emerged from the 
devastation of World Har II with a relatively low ratio of net worth to total 
liabilities--perhaps 40 percent on the average. Hore important though has 
been the impetus of rapid corporate growth: firms have increased capacity 
so rapidly that, despite good profits and the high retention rates already 
not able to finance expansion from internally gener-noted, they simply were 
aced sources. 
2 As a consequence, the net worth total-liability ratio for 
the corporate sector has declined to 17.5 percent by March, 1968. 
1If we make the opposite extreme assumption--that all depreciation and 
retained profits went into financial assets--then external sources financed 
considerably more than all of corporate net investment (236 percent) and of 
gross investment {138 percent). Data derived from Table 1. 
2Profit rates on net worth are comparable to those in the same indus­
tries in the United States, though some-1,hat less per unit of sales. In most 
industries competition was sufficiently severe that profits could not be so 
high as to finance the desired rate of expansion. 
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In seeking external finance, corporations have been constrained both 
by cost and availability, both of which encouraged bank loans rather than 
stock or bond issue. Bonds are an inexpensive source of funds, so inexpen-
sive due to interest rate.controls that there are few buyers. Stock issue 
is very expensive, essentially for institutional reasons. The characteristics 
of these capital markets are treated in the following sections. Banks-­
including commercial banks, trust banks, long-term credit banks, mutual 
savings banks--and other financial institutions (mainly insurance companies) 
have thus been the main institutional sources of external finance. Built 
upon the base of their loans is a pyramid of trade credit, the net effect 
of which is probably to spread credit out more widely than do the loans of 
the financial system. 
Reliance on bank loans poses additional problems in analyzing the re­
lationship of external finance to corporate fixed investment. Although com­
mercial banks make significant amounts of term loans (approximately 25-45 
percent of total loans depending on the type of bank1), in addition many 
short-term loans are rolled over. Indeed, considerable short-term borrowing 
2in fact finances fixed investment. Commercial bankers in Japan are under 
1This includes some 15-25 percent of legally contracted short-term 
loans actually contracted for longer periods. These and related data are 
presented in Ministry of Finance, Banking Bureau, statistical materials 
( 
11 Hinkan Kinyu - Ichibu - 5," October 24, 1968, mimeographed) presented to 
the Financial System Deliberation Committee (Kinyu Seido Chosa Kai). 
2
of 2,000 firms surveyed in June 1968, 21.4 percent indicated that 
short-term loans had been their most important external source for financing 
equipment purchases over the previous two years, and 57.7 percent long-term 
loans. The dependence on short-term loans was particularly large for smaller 
firms, decreasing with firm size; only the largest firms had ready access to 
long-term loans. Data reported in statistical materials presented to Kinyu 
Seido Chosa Kai. 
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no illusion that they are predominantly financing self-liquidating inventory 
investment; they look at the total financial requirements of a borrower and 
his various sources of funds. The division of a total funding commitment 
to a given borrower is divided among subscription to bonds, term loans, and 
short-term loans by rules of thumb, institutional constraints on portfolio 
composition, and relative profitability. It thus makes considerable sense· 
simply to look at total loans, as in Table 1, without attempting to distin­
guish among term or indicated use of funds. 
Nonetheless, some estimation of direct sources of long-term finance 
can be made. Table 3 provides data on the total 3ross supply of long-term 
funds to finance corporate plant and equipment investment, and of the rela­
tive importance of different sources. The pattern that emerges is familiar; 
long-term external financing is important; the major source is long-term 
from private financial institutions, followed by credit from government fi­
nancial institutions. Stock issue has been an erratic source, reaching its 
peak (absolutely as well as relatively) in the stock market boom of 1961; 
overall its relative share has declined. Bond issue also has been somewhat 
erratic, and generally of lesser significance. 
As has been already suggested, the financial system discriminates in 
favor of large corporate borrowers and against small firms. One factor is 
the close ties that have developed among groups of companies and their prime 
bank and its trust bank and insurance company affiliates. In some, but by 
no means all, of these cases the ties derive from historical zaibatsu 
membership, though the postwar reforms eliminated the highly centralized 
arrangements that had characterized prewar zaibatsu. Perhaps equally 
J.959 




































(Specific Sources as percentage of- Total) 
Total Stock Bond Private Finimce Government Finance Foreign 
External Issue Issue Institution Institution Loans 
Sources Loans Credit a 
( '...7' billion) % % % % % 
449.5 7.2' 0.8 63.0 29.0 b 
732.4 11.4 5.2 63.• 0 20.4 b 
1,040.8 18.2 . 3.5 58.8 19.6 "b 
1,046.7 13.6 1.6 63.2 · 20.3 1.2 
. 1,364.9 10.9 3.8 61.7 14.9 4_.2 
1,889.8 17.2 4.9 60.0 15.1 2.7 
2,751.1 23.1 10.8 ,?1.7 11.6 Z.8 l '""-..J 
I 
2,715.9 19.7· 3.• 2 57 .9 . 15.3. 4!0 
3,267.1 10.7· 4.2 .67 .o 13.6 t.~ .4 
3,656.4 13.1 4.1 63.7 15.5. 3.6 
3,897.2 4.3 5.9 72.0 15.4 2~4 
4,286.2 4.3 6.1 70.8 · 16.8 2.0 
5,430.6 3.7 5.8 72.6 15.5 2.5 
6,594.3 5.3 4.7 71.0 15.6 3.4 
Bank of Japan, Keizai Shobumon no Toshi-Chochiku to Shikin Kabusoku (Investment­
Saving and Fund Surplus or Deficit in Main Economic Sectors), July_, 1969.-
External Sources: B_ank of Japan, Eco;:iomic Statist:i_cs of Ja~an, annual issues. 
a= Includes (relatively smail) purchases of bonds. 
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important, large financial institutions conceive of their role as predomi­
nantly financing big business. Even many smaller financial institutions 
prefer to lend to big business where possible. The effective interest rate 
differential between loans to big and small firms is considerably larger 
th&n the default risk differential and cost of making loans, suggesting 
either that smaller financial institutions are highly risk adverse 
or more likely, motivated also by prestige. 
Some indication of this differential treatment 1 as well as a general 
view (once again) of corporate sources and uses of funds, appears in Table 
4. Smaller firms hold more nominally liquid asset·s (because of higher com­
pensatory balance requirements), both provide and receive more trade credit 
(though the sample is probably more heavily weighted toward smaller whole­
sale and retail establishments), and do substantially less fixed investment. 
Small firms have no issuing access to the bond market, and relatively limited 
access to the stock market, as in other countries. 
It remains an open issue as to whether this static inefficiency in 
resource allocation has been all that deletorious dynamically. Adequate 
research has yet to be done on differences by firm size in ability to ab­
sorb and improve technology and in managerial skills. Hore positively, the 
financial system has been sufficiently competitive and growth-oriented in 
lending among large firms that the most rapidly growing enterprises have 
been able to obtain the credit they needed; the correlation between growth 
of sales (or capital), and growth of bank loans is high. 
1 Hore broadly, 
ly_ Kosai et al, "Shikin Haibun Hechanism no Kento" (Discussion of the 
Mechanism of Capital Fund Allocation), Economic Planning Agency, Keizai Geppo, 
July 1964. While there may be a question as to the direction of causality I 
think it correct to say that banks competed to lend to industries and firms 
with high growth prospects, rather than creating that growth by their lending 
policies. 
T°able.4. Sources and Uses of Corporate.Funds 
1960 . 
60 Very Large Large a 
Companies Companies. 
Uses 
Cash and Deposits 7.9 9.1 
Trade Credit 17.8 27.0 
Inventory Investment 7.9 11.9 
Fixed Investment 52.5 -42.1 
Other 13.9' 9.8 
Sources 
Gross Saving 21.4 21.2 
Retained earnings 3.8 6.-2 
Depreciation 17.6 15.0 
Stock Issue 12.9 11.2 
Bond Issue 16.2 7.9 
Short-te:nn Loans 12.2 18.3 
Long-term Loans 15.4 14.6. 
Trll.de Credit 11.0 21.8 
Other 10.9 . 5.0 
a= paid-in capital of at.least 100 million (4701 companies 
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-20-
credit allocation has been efficient for growth (if less so perhaps for wel­
fare) by being directed mainly to expansion of private industrial capacity 
with relatively low capital-output ratios rather than to housing, consumer 
credit, or investment in the provision of public consumer services. 
The Capital Harket: Bonds 
A number of factors contribute to the underdeveloped state of Japan's 
bond market. The early postwar experience of rampant inflation which wiped 
out the value of bonds has left a strong and persisting, somewhat emotional 
distaste for bonds among many individuals. This was enhanced by the lack of 
an adequate trading market until recently, so bonds were relatively illiquid. 
A fairly low level of per capita income (until recently) implied small capa­
city to buy bonds, both by individuals and by such long-term financial in­
as life insurance companies (which indeed have grown rapidly) andstitutions 
pension funds (nascant only). Horeover, income is more equally distributed 
than prewar. Further, the public is not very aware of the relative merits 
of bonds and other long-term fixed-principal assets such as two or five years 
deposits. The bond market is fairly thin and transactions costs are not 
negligible. On the other hand, certain bonds (notably those in bearer form) 
have very favorable tax evasion advantages for individuals: interest is taxed 
at source at 15 percent; more important, they are an excellent vehicle for 
hiding wealth so as to evade inheritance and gift taxes. 
Despite these other factors, clearly the most important cause of the 
underdeveloped state of the bond market is the government-imposed policy of 
new bondrelatively low and unchanging interest yields on all types of 
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issues. This has several major consequences. First, potential institutional 
and individual bondholders are able to obtain alternative assets of equal 
risk, equal liquidity and greater yield. In other words, market demand is 
limited by the inferior characteristics of bonds; in contrast, of course, 
issuers of bonds desire to issue more at the given terms. Second, in order 
to issue any bonds at all alternatives to the price mechanism had to be de­
veloped. Third, in order to minimize the unacceptability of new bond issue, 
market yields determined by trading in already-issued bonds had to be kept 
as close as possible to new-issue yields. Since a free market in bonds would 
inevitably result in some fluctuations in prices and yields as monetary con­
ditions tightened or eased, trading has been inconsistent with the new issue 
yield policy. The policy-makers have used, in various degrees and at various 
times, different ways to resolve this inconsistency: pegging, restrictions 
on trading of already-issued bonds, and grudging and minor adjustments of 
issue yields. 
The mechanism of bond issue varies for each major category of bonds: 
those issued by central government, public corporations, local governments, 
corporate enterprises, and long-term credit banks. The first three are de­
termined mainly by budgetary factors without direct regard for the state 
of the bond market. The government did not reinaugurate net new bond issue 
until the 1965 recession, though it refinanced its small debt as it matured. 1 
1
Prior to 1965 strong private aggregate demand, rapidly increasing tax 
revenues due to growth of GNP and a progressive tax structure, and a modest 
government expenditure policy enabled the government to pursue a high aggre­
gate demand to policy consistent with a balanced or surplus budget. See 
Hugh T. Patrick, liCyclical Instability and Fiscal-Monetary Policy in Post­
war Japan," in W.W. Lockwood, ed., The State and Economic Enterprise in 
Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965). 
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Since then the government has continued a relatively modest deficit finan­
cing program despite the resumption of high aggregate demand and rapid 
growth; the political decision was made to increase government investment 
expenditures somewhat as a percentage of GNP without increasing the tax 
revenue share concommitantly. Data on government and other bond issue ap­
pear in Table 5. As Figure 1 indicates, the issue yield on government bonds 
has been very stable; the yield on other issues is determined in relation to 
the yield on central government bonds (and on public corporations bonds 
prior to 1965). 
The issuing system for government bonds is simple: 90 percent of any 
issue is allocated among various financial institutions, particularly the 
large city banks; the remaining 10 percent is allocated to securities com­
panies to sell to the public, or to hold whatever is unsold (though probably 
with special financial assistance from the Bank of Japan). No financial 
institution would seriously consider refusine to buy its allocated amount; 
In a sense, this situationthe government could retaliate in too many ways. 
exemplifies much of Japanese financial, business and government bureaucracy 
attitudes: there are certain areas in which cooperation rather than competi­
tion is ordained and desirable; any losses in the small (in a specific con­
text) are more than compensated by benefits in the large (other specific 
contexts). For example, the burden of forced bond purchase by city banks 
is eased by allowing them as collateral for loans from the Bank of Japan; 
smaller financial institutions are not abie to borrow from the central bank. 
In turn large financial and business institutions influence the Liberal­
Democratic Party's decisions on the size and composition of the budget and 
-23-· 
Table 5. Bond Issue and Amount Outstanding 






Short•• terrn Securities 3 months 1,792 
Bonds 7 years 2,455 
Local Government Bonds 7 years 1,120 
Public Corporation Bonds 7 years 4,411 
Industrial Bonds 7 years 2,406 
Banks 
Discount debentures 1 year 1,281 
Bonds 4 years, 3,378 
;n months 
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the attendant amount of government and public corporation bonds to be issued. 
The amount of issue of government-guaranteed bonds of public corporations, 
such as the Japan Telephone and Telegraph Corporation and the Japan National -
Railways, is determined as one component of their overall investment finan­
cing program, in turn a part of the government's Investment and Loan Program. 
Somewhat more than one-quarter of these bonds are sold to users, related to 
specific services provided by public corporations, or to suppliers. The 
most notable example is dendensai (Telephone-Telegraph bonds) sold to tele-
phone subscribers as a: condition for obtainin3 a telephone. The remainder 
are absorbed by financial institutions on a basis similar to government 
bonds, after securities companies have tried to sell as much as possible to 
customers. 
Local goverrment bond issue is small. 
1 A considerable portion is placed 
with local financial institutions with which deposit relationships are main­
tained and with local suppliers. The remainder is spread among financial 
institutions on an allocated basis. 
Of most interest here is the issuing mechanism for industrial bonds. 
The decision on how many bonds will be issued, and what companies will issue 
them, rests with two committees (Kisai Choseikai and Jutaku Hakkokai) made 
up of the four major securities companies which serve as underwriters, the 
major financial institutions (notably seven city banks and the most impor­
tant long-term credit bank, the Industrial Bank of Japan), together with 
1Local governments rely heavily on tax-sharing with the central govern­
ment, plus transfers and loans from the central level. For more detail see 
Hugh T. Patrick, "The Financing of the Public Sector in Postwar Japan," in 
L. Klein and K. 0hkawa, eds., Economic Growth-The Japanese Experience Since 
the Meiji Era, (Richard D. Irwin, Homewood, Ill., 1968). 
-41,, 
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(now) informal representations from the liinistry of Finance and Bank of 
Japan. 1 The general guidelines (issue at a fixed, unchanging interest rate, 
priority to public utilities, as much issue as possible depending on con­
ditions) are sufficiently well set and followed that little direct govern­
mental interference is necessary. Probably the most important function of 
the committee is to determine the annual amount of industrial bonds to be 
issued. The assumption of steady growth of issue is substantially influenced 
by expectations of the degree of tightness or ease of financial markets, 
government projections of its various types of bond issues, public sale of 
recent issues, and conditions in the trading markets for already-issued 
bonds. These negotiations serve as one channel for communications among 
large financial institutions, big business and the central government poli­
ticians and bureaucrats. Cyclical financial tightness, and accordingly 
higher interest rates on competing assets, have indeed induced a strong 
cyclical pattern to new bond issue; the major financial institutions have 
been able to damp down total issue, while corporate issuers have not worried 
greatly since they will be financed instead by bank loans, if at a somewhat 
2
higher rate of interest. 
Once the total has been determined, the committee has well-defined rules 
of thumb for allocation among the many potential issuers and various potential 
1
These committees trace directly from prewar syndicates underwriting 
industrial bond issues, though markets were free then. This historical 
continuity explains in substantial part the continuing important roles of 
the Industrial Bank and Hitsui Bank, and the system of direct, informal 
negotiation. 
2 see Takashi Ishigoro, "Koshasai Ichiba no Shomondai," (Some Problems 
of the Bond Harket), Japan Development Bank, Chosa Geppo, Vol. 16, No. 9 
(December 1967). 
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buyers, almost entirely institutional. First priority goes to the electric 
power and gas companies; it is generally accepted that they and certain 
other public utilities provide services essential for the continued opera­
tion of the economy. The rule is that roughly 40 percent of new bond issue 
will be by the nine electric power companies; purchase is distributed among 
the major banks and insurance companies proportional to size. 
The remaining 60 percent is divided amons the largest 225 or so indus­
trial enterprises which meet the criteria for eli3ibility: listing on a 
major stock exchange, certain paid-in capital and net worth level, minimum 
dividend rate relative to par value of shares, and certain other financial 
ratios. These criteria are used also to divide companies into five cate­
gories of decreasing creditworthiness. Not only are there small issue­
yield differentials by category, but those eight companies in the top 
category can issue bonds most frequently--every two months or so. In 
contrast, those in the bottom category (firms which have not paid dividends 
recently) can issue only to refinance maturing bonds. Rules of thumb, and 
the total to be issued, determine the amount a particular company is allowed 
to issue. 
Almost all (89 percent at the end of 1968) of industrial bond issues 
are held by financial institutions, having been originally purchased by 
them. The main bank of a given industrial issuer is the largest purchaser; 
bond purchase is a substitute for term loans. Typically, the underwriting 
security company draws up a list of buyers and amount to be purchased by 
each on the basis of the financial institution's degree of connection with 
the issuer. These include the main bank, other city bank lenders to the 
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firm, affiliated insurance companies and local bank lenders (to locak plants, 
etc). Financial institutions closely connected to the issuer usually absorb 
60-80 percent of a new issue, the rest being spread among reciprocating finan~ 
cial institutions, suppliers and users (a small proportion), and any individual 
buyers. 
The yield to subscribers for industrial bonds has been 7 1/2 - 8 percent. 
Costs of issuance have declined somewhat in recent years, now on the order 
of 0.95 - 1.10 percentage points. While comparable to other countries, these 
costs may be high because there are no underwriting risks. The cost to 
corporate issuers is only slightly (probably less than 0.5 percentage points) 
below that of loans of comparable maturity (taking into account compensatory 
balances). Even so, corporate issuers are sufficiently sensitive to the 
bonds if possible at prevailingdifferential that they would issue more 
rates; one indication is that certain major companies have issued bonds 
in foreign capital markets with higher yields than equivalent issue in 
Japan. Since the main bank also earns trustee fees from the bond issue 
of its customers it may be indifferent between bonds and loans. 
The final category--and quantitatively important as is clear from Table 
5--are bonds issued by mainly the three long-term credit banks, of which 
the Industrial Bank of Japan is the most important, and by certain other 
specialized banks. The function of the long-term credit banks is clear 
from their title; they make long-term loans (typically seven to ten years), 
primarily to finance plant and equipment investment, and primarily to large 
industrial enterprises. They are enjoined from collecting deposits from 
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other than their borrowers and from government instrumentalities (of negli­
gible importance). Their main source of funds is the issuance of bank 
debentures sold mainly to individuals through securities companies (at a 
handsome commission of about 1 percent) at a yield to buyers somewhat above 
the one-year time deposit rate; and five year bank bonds, sold mainly to 
1commercial banks and other financial institutions. Long-term credit banks 
have a long history in Japan, founded under government encouragement in 
line with its view that specialized financial institutions should exist to 
perform specialized financing functions. 
But why should other financial institutions purchase bank debentures 
from what after all are increasingly regarded as competitors as department­
store banking has begun to emerge? One reason is that they are expected 
to. But there is considerably more to the answer than that. Essentially 
the question is who will obtain access to the funds that long-term credit 
banks obtain from individuals. City banks are major purchasers of bank 
debenture issues. Each city bank knows that the long-term credit banks 
will make loans to that city bank's preferred group of customers in amount 
approximately double the amount of bank debentures which that city bank 
purchases. With long-term loanable funds in especially short supply, this 
is one way to help prime customers (no doubt with a quid pro quo some­
where else in the bank-customer relationship). This commitment of loans 
amounting to two times bond purchase is long-run; it does not need to be 
negotiated case-by-case, or even on an annual basis. 
1 
rn addition, borrowers are usually required to purchase bank bonds 
equal to about 10 percent of their loan (the interest rate differential is 
about 1 percentage point), as well as to hold compensating deposit balances 
of about 15 percent. 
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Local banks and smaller financial institutions have similar incentives 
to purchase bank debentures. A long-term credit bank loan to an enterprise 
is a clear indication of its high quality; this not only enhances local 
bank prestige (its customers are good companies) but makes it easier to put 
together a package of funds for that company from other sources (such as 
insurance companies) as well. Moreover, long~term credit bank loans to small 
business are usually done ·through the agency of smaller financial institutions, 
which thereby earn a commission. It pays to have a good relationship with 
the long-term credit banks. 
This somewhat lenghy discussion of the non-market mechanism by which 
various categories of bonds are issued in Japan suggests how the system 
operates. As an issuing mechanism it wotks effectively for the given quan­
tities; yet financial institutions and other buyers are sufficiently eco­
nomically rational that in fact only relatively small amounts of bonds are 
issued. 
The fundamental problems of this mechanism of bond issue are laid bare 
when holders decide to sell their bonds prior to maturity. Free financial 
markets meet this desire through trading in secondary markets--over-the­
counter or in listed bond markets--with supply equated to demand by changes 
in bond prices and hence yields. In such markets new issue yields are de­
termined predominantly by the yield on already-issued securities, and fluctu­
ate according to market conditions. In Japan the co-existence of the fixed­
interest system of new bond issue and a free secondary market of fluctua­
ting yields implies at times a gap in yields which a free market would 
arbitrage away. 
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How have the monetary authorities handled this contradiction? The main 
approach prior to 1966 was simply not to allow a secondary market in bonds 
to exist in any meaningful, substantial sense.s;:,--..sc. The bond market was 
opened through listing on the Tokyo Stock Exchange in April 1956, but trans-
actions were limited as the government put pressure on financial institutions 
not to sell at yields different from new-issue yields. Even this market was 
closed in April 1962, when a tight money policy was being pursued, and was 
not re-opened until February 1966. Of course some over-the-counter trans­
actions were made at higher yields, but they were semi-clandestine and prob­
ably never very large in aggregate. 
The one exception was the market in seven-year Telephone-Telegraph 
bonds (dendensai). Many telephone subscribers regarded these as a cost of 
obtaining phone service rather than as a financial asset, so sold them im­
mediately. A secondary market was allowed to develop in Tel-Tel bonds, so 
that from 1955 on they have been the best indicator of market-determined 
long-term interest rates. The yield line for Tel-Tel bonds in Figure 1 
make clear the fluctuations of long-term interest rates over the cycle, and 
the tendency for free market rates to be above the controlled rates for 
new issues. The long-term market yield (as measured by the Tel-Tel bonds) 
has been sensitive to changes in the call rate; a slightly higher elasticity 
relationship for Japan than West Germany suggests that these markets oper­
1ate reasonably well in Japan. 
The secondary market in bonds has operated rather freely and actively 
since February 1966. The government had long been under pressure to liberalize 
1 see Ishiguro, ~- cit., p. 7. 
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capital markets as well as everything else. An easy fiscal-money policy 
following the 1965 recession had pushed market interest rates down suffi­
ciently so that it was judged (correctly) that market yields would not 
diverge significantly from the new-issue fixed yield structure. 
There are two secondary bond markets: transactions in listed bonds 
on the major stock exchanges; and an over-the-counter market. The listed 
market is notational: only a small, though representative, proportion of 
outstanding bonds are listed; standard published yield data are derived from 
transactions in listed bonds; only 2-3 percent of all bond trades are in 
the listed market. The yields in the over-the-counter market appear only 
1
negligibly higher than in the listed market. However, the over-the-counter 
market is certainly less than perfect, with special deals and lack of know­
ledge, so published data on prices and rates may be incorrect. 
Early success in having only a negligible gap between market-determined 
yields on already-issued bonds and the fixed rate on new issues persisted 
only until mid-1967. For balance-of-payments reasons the monetary authori­
ties initiated a tight money policy at that time, with interest rates 
rising. The gap between secondary market yield and new issue yield widened 
significantly, as sho,,m in Figure 2. An easing of money brought some re­
duction in market rates in the spring of 1968, but some tightening in 1968 
and throughout 1969 kept the gap wide. 
The existence of such a gap of course made the new issue market more 
attractive than ever, with pressures on the government and others to reduce 
1A preliminary examination of published data on yields in both markets 
suggest this conclusion, though further research is needed. Data appear in 
Japan Securities Dealers Association, Choken Gyoho (Securities Business), 
monthly. 
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issue and to increase issue yields. The system's response has been varied, 
essentially by type of bond. As indicated in Figure 2, the market yield on 
government bonds was kept very close to the new issue yeild; some decrease 
in price and increase in market yield occurred for local government and 
corporate industrial bonds; and a larger increase in market yield prevailed 
on bank bonds. Accordingly, the margin between governments and other bonds 
widened substantially,as demonstrated in Figure 3. This was due more to 
rationing and other non-market reasons rather than to investor increased 
aversion to whatever (slight) default risk that exists. 
The market yield on government bonds was held down, despite the over­
all rise in interest rates, by pegging. The Bank of Japan purchased govern­
ment bonds in the market even more vigorously in 1968 than in 1967. Finan­
cial institutions were informally but vigorously urged not to sell in the 
market despite their shortage of funds relative to alternative attractive 
investments. Moreover, the larger institutions have had an interest in 
maintaining the market both because they use their government bonds exten­
sively as collateral (valued at market) for loans from the Bank of Japan; 
and because they want to make what sales they can to the Bank of Japan at 
a good price. Smaller institutions and interest-sensitive individuals have 
taken the opportunity to unload their holdings of government bonds. At 
the same time the government continues to place new issue by allocation to 
financial institutions. The securities companies continue to sell part of 
their allocation to those individuals who are highly risk averse, interest­
rate insensitive, uninformed, and/or gullible. Presumably the Bank of Japan 
1 arranges to finance the rest, though the data are difficult to obtain. 
1The Bank of Japan is precluded from purchasing long-term government 
bonds until one year has elapsed after issue, but it can readily make loans 
with any government bonds as collateral, or make other substitute arrangements. 
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l~1y has the price declined--and the yield risen--so much more for bank 
bends than for corporate and local government bonds? Here the answer seems 
to lie in the closer customer relationships that financial institutions have 
with corporations and local governments than with the long-term credit banks. 
For the sake of these relationships, and to help new issues by them, the 
major financial institutions are reluctant to sell their holdings of corporate 
or local government bonds, and may even help support the market. After a 
short learning process (from August 1967 to February 1968) holders of bank 
bonds evidently came to regard them as rather freely tradeable: their yield 
moves very closely ~vith the Tel-Tel bond yields (Figure 3). Sale of bank 
bonds became the first item for portfolio adjustment, even while (of neces­
sity) newly-issued bank bonds were being subscribed to. This gap in yields 
has of course put the long-term er.edit banks in a difficult position, as net 
new issue has tended to decreas-. The effective yield on one-year discount 
deb8ntures, sold mainly to individuals, has been increased by adding a traf­
fic insurance feature while maintaining the fixed interest rate. It is not 
entirely clear how they have succeeded recently in selling their five-year 
bonds--no doubt a continuation of administrative pressure and some surrep­
titious price shading. 
The justification for the initial development and persistence of the 
government's policy of relatively low fixed interest rates, especially for 
1long-term claims, has never been clearly articulated. There are a number 
1The interest rate structure has been too low to clear financial 
markets in Japan, but was continuously above foreign interest rates until 
1968. The monetary authorities effectively control foreign short-term 
capital flows by a variety of indirect methods (special reserve require­
ments, interest rate ceilings, loan limits, etc.) so as to reduce adverse 
effects of interest rate differentials. 
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of strands in the argument, many of them familiar if benighted. Policy-makers 
have long felt that long-term investment, especially in "key industries," 
should be encouraged by low interest rates. They worry about interest as a 
cost of production, particularly in export competition. Hore substantially, 
they suggest that investment demand and saving supply are both interest-in­
elastic, at least within a reasonable upward range; on the other hand, no one 
suggests that interest rates should remain semi-controlled but lowered to 
say 3-4 percent. And then there is the Ministry of Finance prejudice against 
high rates on government debt--not simply as a budgetary cost item but as a 
matter of national prestige. And some, though by no means all, government 
bureaucrats prefer the present system of more direct, if informal controls, 
with close and continuous contact and exchange of information, over a more 
impersonal, perhaps less predictable, free market system. After all, the 
proof is in the pudding: the present system, broadly viewed, has worked very 
well indeed by growth criteria. It's not clear to what degree consultation, 
administrative guidance, and restriction of market mechanisms are essential 
for success, or perhaps even hamper it, but why take a chance changing things. 
Support of the present system, and opposition to the development of 
a large bond market with fluctuating interest rates equilibrating demand and 
supply in outstanding and new issues, is not limited to government bureau­
crats. Hany large financial institutions prefer a small bond market, even 
if they have to subsidize it. Bonds, after all, are a substitute for their 
loans. Hore important, given the always-sensed shortage of funds, bonds are 
a substitute for their time deposits, the interest rates for which are rela­
tively low. Public sector issuers probably prefer the present system; after 
-38-
all their financial needs are reasonably well accomodated by the allocation 
system, and the interest costs are less than they would be in a free market 
system. Big business issuers of bonds would probably prefer a free market 
mechanism so that they could issue more bonds, even at somewhat higher cost. 
However, the interest saving over long-term loans is not great, and after 
all they have preferred access to loans, so the incentive to rock the boat 
is not great. 
The main beneficiaries of a large, vigorous, unrestricted bond market 
would be individual wealth holders, smaller financial institutions, and 
medium-sized companies and perhaps insurance companies and their policy­
holders. Individuals would benefit from higher rates and, probably more im­
portant would become more aware of the opportunities they currently forego. 
Moreover, bond competition would put pressure to raise and adjust more 
flexibly interest rates on time deposits. However, the potential benefi­
ciaries are not well organized, and do not have great political strength. 
The Capital Market: Equity Shares 
The data provided above (notably in Tables 1, 3, and 4) indicate that 
stock issue for the period as a whole has not been a major source of external 
finance and that its role has been erratic, peaking in 1961. The reasons 
are quite different from those governing the non-development of the bond 
market. Of course some factors limit both--the fairly low per capita in­
comes, relatively equal income distribution, and small size of life insurance 
companies and pension funds. Yet stocks are bought and sold in a free market 
and there are few legal or other governmental restrictions on new stock 
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issue. The market mechanism is allowed full play. 
The major factor retarding stock issue as an external source of cor­
porate finance operates on the supply side, rather than on the demand side 
as in the case of the bond market. For a combination of instiuttional rea­
sons stock issue is a very expensive source of funds--some 16-18 percent. 
As in other countries, interest is deductible from corporate pre-tax profits 
as a cost while dividends are subject to the corporate profits tax (at a 
slightly lower rate than that on retained earnings). Hore important, it has 
bsEn the custom since stock was first issued in the 1880's to make new issue 
at par 1 in the form of rights to current stockholders, regardless of the •~ 
-It 
prevailing market price (so long as it is greater than par) . Tied to this 
has been the practice to quote the dividend rate relative to par, and to 
2have a high dividend rate--at least 10 percent. This dividend rate is 
maintained even after new shares are issued, 
Before discussing the supply and demand side of the stock market in 
more detail, let me sketch in the institutional structure of the market. 
Stock exchanges exist in eight major cities, but about three-quarters of 
the value of trading is done on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and most of the 
remainder on the Osaka Stock Exchange. The Tokyo Exchange has 83 securities 
1Par is typically 50 yen (14 cents) or, in a few instances 500 yen 
($1.49); trading in the former is in 1000-share units, the latter in 100-
share units. 
2 rn the early phase of industrialization this is the rate individuals 
demanded to purchase shares; since that meant almost complete payout of pro­
fits in many cases, it is not surprising that firms then issued new shares 
as a source of finance and that stock prices did not go so far above par. 
The tradition of dividends at least 10 percent of par continues to be so 
strong that some large firms--such as the steel companies--in certain re­
cession periods have maintained that dividend rate, despite inadequate 
profits (less than payout), by borrowing. 
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dealer members. The "Big Four'i securities companies have a predominant 
position in the industry. Securities dealers may serve not only as brokers, 
but also as dealers on their own account, underwriters, and participants in 
syndicates distributing securities. 
1 The securities industry is less well 
regulated than in the United States. Turnover is large--greater relative 
to the number of shares outstanding than in the United States--despite a 
large proportion of shares stably held by institutions and some individuals. 
With markets somewhat thin, there is some ·manipulation, advantageous use 
of insider information, flogging of shares in particular companies, and 
other market imperfections--but not enough to discredit the market severely. 
The most important stock market--in value, transactions, and pres­
tige--is the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. On it are listed 
(as of September 1969) some 694 companies with a market value of $40.8 bil­
lion and a paid-in capital par value of $15.0 billion. 
2 In 1961 a second 
section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange was inaugurated to trade shares in 
smaller companies previously traded over-the-counter. Some 550 companies 
are listed but with a market value c:if only $3.3 billion, and paid-in capital 
par value of $1.1 billion. There is not a substantial over-the-counter 
market in shares of other, smaller companies. To be traded (and to sell 
new shares publicly) smaller firms try to meet the standard listing require­
ments of the second section, while many firms on the second section attempt 
1Host new stock issu~s are not underwritten since they are sold on a 
rights basis to stockholders. 
2Tokyo Stock Exchange, Research and Statistics Department, 'Monthly 
Statistics Report, No. 155 (September 1968), in Japanese and English. 
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eventually to move up to the first section. 
The distribution of stock ownership is given in Table 6. While based 
on the number of shares outstanding without weighting for their value, the 
distribution is in line with flow-of-funds value data. However, it includes 
a much larger number of companies than those listed on stock exchanges; for 
the latter the share of financial institutions, securities companies, and 
investment trusts loom larger. 
Most individual Japanese investors apparently regard publicly-listed 
stock as a quite risky opportunity for capital gains suitable mainly for 
speculation. As in other countries stock is purchased only after substantial 
time deposits have been accumulated. 
l Yield is perceived of mainly as capi-
2
tal gain rather than dividends. Tax laws are advantageous: there is no 
tax for short-term or long-term capital gains. This contributes to a short­
run, speculative approach to stock purchase. As with interest, dividends 
are accorded favorable income tax treatment. 
Institutional buyers have had longer-run objectives in purchasing and 
holding stock. They are no doubt 1nore aware of the long-run appreciation 
of stock value in Japan's dynamic economy. Life insurance companies hold 
almost a quarter of their assets in stock, and other insurance companies 
1According to survey data, families with a net worth in financial 
assets on average of about $1,200 hold only 6.7 percent in stock (including 
mutual funds); the proportion rises by income (and wealth) group to 19.3 
percent for families with a net worth of $60,750. Bondholdings are much 
smaller: 2.2 percent for the former group and 3.2 percent for the latter. 
Japan Economic Planning Agency, Economic Survey of Japan, 1967-1968, 
(English edition, Tokyo: Japan Times, 1968), p. 168. 
2For example, certain shares, such as steel companies and electric 
power companies, have had little price movement and dividend yields of 7-10 
percent, compared with 5.5 percent for one-year time deposits. Round lots 
could be purchased for as little as $150-200; transactions costs would absorb 
the yield differential only for short periods of stock holding. 
Table 6 
Distd.1mlion of Stock 0mw.rsh5-p. by--~-~---~-------..------------~-- -~-~-
(in percent)·. 
Individuals .42.0 
Corporate Enterprises 23.1 
Financial Institutions 26.2 
SecurH_ics Cornpnn:i.es 
a
Investment Trusts 2.2 
Government Institutions 0,3 
Foreign En terpr is esb 1.9 
Other Foreigners 
.a. 1 f dmutua. ·un .Ss 
b . Jma1n.y cases of direct investmerit 
Not~: Based on data from all 4,686 companies with paid­
in capital of¥ 100 million ($278,000) or more, 
including both listed and unlisted companies. 
Source: Hank of: Jo.pans Statistics D2p~rtr,12.nts Economic 
Stat.istfrs_Annunl,__1968 (March, 1969), p. H,i-: 
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more than 30 percent (both at book value); perhaps they would hold even more 
except for legal restrictions. For banks and corporate enterprises perhaps 
an even more important objective has been to maintain and cement good relation­
1
ships with customers and other friendly firms. 
Stock ownership of large firms is highly diffused in Jap~n, mainly as 
a consequence of Allied Occupation zaibatsu dissolution and anti-trust reforms. 
As a consequence there is substantial separation of ownership and control, 
which rests in the hands of a self-perpetuating management. Take-over bids 
and raids by dissident stockholders are unknown. One reason of course is 
that for many companies a majority of the shares are held by friendly, af­
filiated, hence safe, institutions and certain individuals--an objective 
that management strives for. Only if management performs very poorly indeed 
is it subject to dismissal, and then at the in~tigation of the company's 
main bank. 
lianagement thus has greater latitude both in the mix of its objectives 
and in its operations. Nanagement does not view the company's interests as 
necessarily identical with stockholders; for this reason it regards new 
stock issue at par as a high-cost source of external financin8 rather than 
simply as a means of providing some capital gains to stockholders. Profit 
maximization is not the sole objective; also important are growth, market 
share, and to some extent employee welfare and the "national interest!' 
(though usually defined to business' advantage). 
Since the main constraint on new stock issue is its high cost because 
1Banks cannot hold more than 10 percent of the shares of any corpora­
tion; many business corporations of course hold large amounts of stock in 
subsidiaries. 
-44-
of the combination of issuance at par and high dividend rates,
1 why not change 
the system and issue stock at slightly under market prices? If this were 
done firms could raise considerably more funds in any given issuance of share·s 
and., more importantly, at a cost of funds highly competitive with long-term 
loans or bond issue. The answer is that stockholders object strenuously: they 
make a capital gain out of the present system which would instead go to the 
company. Indeed, individuals demand for a particular company's shares is much 
influenced by expectations whether it will soon issue new rights and in what 
amount. 
2 
For similar reasons stockholders rejected convertible bond issues, 
which have to be approved at stockholder meetings. Even so stock issuance 
at market price occurs to some degree--on average about 5-6 percent of total 
But evennew paid-in capital, having reached a peak of 8. 8 percent in 1961. 
in those cases it has been usually achieved as part of a package including a 
few shares at (15 percent below) market, a few shares distributed free, and 
most issued at par. 
Under these circumstances, why do listed companies issue new shares at 
all? 3 After all, it is cheaper to borrow.
4 One important reason is that 
1of the 617 companies listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange, 83.3 percent paid dividends of 10 percent or more of par, and 
another 10.6 percent paid 8 or 9 percent. 
2
This can be simply illustrated. Suppose the market sets the combina­
tion of yield and growth on a company such that a 5 percent dividend yield 
on market price is sufficient; a 5 yen dividend (10 percent of par of 50 
yen) implies a price of 100 yen. But if new shares are issued at 50, they 
will also be worth about 100 yen .. This opportunity for capital gain drives 
up the demand for old (pre-rights) shares to 150 yen. 
3
Tbe following discussion excludes companies in sick industries, or 
with weak profit performance, which issue stock dividends in place of cash 
dividends. 
4This may not be true, especially for smaller, or lower priority com­
panies, in tight money periods when credit is not available; stock issuance 
apparently has increased in such periods even though stock prices are 
relatively depressed. 
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the llinistry of Finance and major institutional lenders deplore continuous 
declines in the ratio of net worth to total liabilities, and put pressure 
on companies to issue stock in order to increase these ratios. Noreover 
many firms regard it as natural to issue new shares every several years, as 
a part of their external financing program and for the sake of stockholders-­
without analyzing the matter carefully. But this explanation does not tell 
us much. 
I regard the following set of interrelated hypothesis as useful though 
they have not been adequately tested. Management is concerned with its own 
good performance, for reasons of salary, bonus, prestige and maintenance of 
position. Two criteria of good performance are: maintenance of a certain 
"normal" dividend per share measured at par; and total dividend payout fal­
ling within an acceptable range, x to y percent, of total profits after 
tax (O < x < payout ratio< y < 100). lloth criteria have developed histori­
cally and institutionally. For a payout ratio less than x stockholders 
complain; above y the firm retains insufficient funds to finance expansion, 
particularly since lenders insist on some share of new projects being fi­
nanced internally. 
Given this institutional environment, what is rational management be­
havior concerning dividend policy and stock issue, both secularly and 
cyclically? The first objective is to maintain the "normal'' dividend rate, 
Hanagement cannot shift the definition of the "normal" dividend rate down­
ward--since it would be de facto indication of poor managerial performance-­
unless it is generally recognized as a firm in a sicl~, declining industry 
(for example, coal mining) or perhaps a still sick but growine industry 
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(shipping). On the other hand, management has little incentive to shift the 
definition of the "norma1u dividend rate upward, because the short-run ad­
vantage of being praised for "excellent performance'' is more than offset by -
the longe-r--rurr uncer.tainty over profits .and ··hence whether the-.higher-'1n-ormaltt 
dividend ·rate. can always· be main.tained. - It is safer .to avoid .the risk.of 
setting a higher norm. 
Secular.ly·profits .increase, so for a given number of .shares and given·· 
"normal" dividend rate the payout ratio decreases. As it goes below x , 
management has two ways. to raise the payout ratio : to increase the dividend 
rate or to increase the number of shares outstanding. Hanagement does not · 
increase the dividend rate for two reasons : it• do·es not -want to raise th.e 
normal rate, and it receives nothing in return. In contrast, if it issues 
additional shares and maintains the normal dividend rate, it obtains addi­
tional external funds and raises the net worth ratio. Since the company has 
to increase payout anyway, ~nee the ratio falls below x ·, in effect· the 
1 
cost of stock issue is zero, · rather than the high effective cost the firm··· 
has above ~x . · (This should not be viewed as discontinuous : as ·payout d.e-
--.clines toward x the· presure to increase payout, and hence to issue stock, 
intensifies . ) 
The secular trend is somewhat. .complicated by cyclical.fluctuations 
in corporate profits. Given the high degree .of. leverage (int.erest--costsL 
.despite smoothing accounting window-dressing which overs.tates profits in 
recession and understates them in booms, the ..absolute fluctuations. in 
1
Actually positive (if small) if there is some increased risk of 
maintaining in the future the normal dividend rate due to the increased 
number of shares. 
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profits have been wide. Thus in some recessions the "normal" dividend rate 
may imply a payout ratio greater than y , in which case the rate has to 
be reduced. As soon as profits recover sufficiently, however, the "normal" 
dividend rate is resumed. In contrast in booms profits may be exceptionally 
high; corporations may opt for a one-time special extra dividend on the 
grounds that the amount of profits is not sustainable so that stock should 
not be issued. 
I have suggested that the "normal" dividend rate may be on the order 
of 10 percent of par. The acceptable payout ratio range may be between 30-
70 percent. However, these institutionally-determined ratios probably vary 
somewhat by industry, and perhaps even by firm. Horeover, they are not im­
mutable: norms gradually change witlt altered patterns of performance, cer­
tainly for industries at least. 
One might expect that Japan's outstanding growth performance and 
prospects, together with the limited neu supply of shares, would have pushed 
stock prices up dramatically and market valuations of stock a high multiple 
of earnings. Hhile prices have indeed moved dramatically, price-earnings 
ratios have remained low relative to the United States--on average for the 
Tokyo first section not more than about 12 times. The focus on short-term 
gains rather than long-run appreciation in value based on increases in 
profits per share is one factor. Indeed, most Japanese investors seem to 
remain more interested in a company's likelihood of neH share issue at par 
than in its price-earnings ratio. Only in recent years, and at the insti­
gation mainly of American analysts, have data on P/E ratios begun to be 
published, although the underlying data have always been available. 
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Another factor has been the public's perception that stocks are highly 
speculative, with considerable risk of price decreases. This view is well 
based in fact; many individuals Here burned in the 1961 speculative boom and 
crash. From a 1958 low of about 400 the Tokyo row-Jones went to 1356 by the 
end of 1960. By early 1961 everybody in Japan had heard how one's money 
could be doubled in a few weeks or months by purchasing stock; as in specu­
lative manias every,;-,here many people entered the stock market for the first 
time. Securities houses encouraged the euphoric boom; salesmen marketed 
shares door-to-door, and by motorcycle from fannhouse to farmhouse. The mar­
ket peaked at 1830 in July 1961 before slidinc off some 30 percent by year­
end. The public retired, unhappy, from the stock market, and only in the 
last year or so has begun to return. 
1 
It was not until late 1968 that the 
market once again reached its 1961 Iow-Jones peak, and then at much lower 
price-earnings ratios. 
Together;·,;.1ith everything else related to the stock market, neH issues 
peaked in 1961--as both a relative and an absolute source of external fi­
nance. The stock mark.et boom made it easy (practically for the first 
time) to issue ne,·, shares, and indeed issuance fed the boom psychology. At 
the same time money was fairly tight, so for various reasons firms brought 
out new stock issues. The events of 1961 9utshadow the cyclical pattern 
of stock issue earlier noted. Subsequently neH issue slumped absolutely 
and relatively until the late 1960 's. ~-1ith the current boom in the stock 
market, renewed tightness of money, and gradually changing attitudes about 
1
rnvestment trusts (mutual funds) Here a major vehicle in 1961, since 
they have shrunk substantially, with cancellations and redemptions out­
weighing neu subscriptions. 
issuance at par, new issue is again on the rise. Yet its significance remains 
considerably less than earlier. Projections for i.970 boast that the issuance 
of stock will be the second highest on record--second to 1961. With the 
total industrial demand for external funds more than double the 1961 level, 
stock issuance still has far to go even to reach its earlier relative sig­
nificance. 
Conclusion 
Japan presents a, superficially at least, anomalous case where corporate 
sector reliance on external finance is extremely high yet reliance on bond and 
stock issue as a source of funds is very lou. This has been possible because 
the financial system has effectively intermediated by providing substitutes 
for bonds and stock issue in the form of long-term and to some extent even 
short-term loans. 
It is easy to see how long-term loans can be fairly close substitutes 
for bonds, since the difference in default risk is not substantial and bonds 
in Japan are not so liquid anyhow, at least for major financial institutions. 
Since in effect the Bank of Japan guarantees major financial institutions 
that they will not suffer a liquidity crisis singly or as a group,this would 
not be a strong motive for a free bond martet. The main opportunity fore­
gone under the present system is the ability of a large financial institution 
to adjust its portfolio composition by substantial bond sales. 
The apparent willingness of financial institutions to allow the sub­
stitution, to a substantial degree, of loans for stock with the attendant 
decline in large corporate net worth ratios is less obviously explained. 
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In effect banks )rnve taken on much of the risk of bankruptcy of large corpora­
tions. This risk is all the Breater because there are no limits on the size 
of loans to individual companies, so loan balances of 40 percent, 60 percent, 
or even 100 percent of a bank's net worth are typical. However, the risk of 
big business bankruptcy or insolvency
1 is borne to a substantial degree by 
society (together with the stockholders) rather than by creditors--at least 
large creditors. In effect, large financial institutions are such heavy 
creditors of big business that they must continue to make loans under any 
circumstances; the financial system is sufficiently centralized that the Bank 
of Japan cannot afford to let any major financial institution close its doors 
. . 1 . 2f or f ear of a genera1 f inancia panic. This socialization of risk seems 
on the whole sensible, even though it continues the discrimination in favor 
of bigness. 
To what extent has an underdeveloped capital market impeded Japan's 
economic performance? Of course it is difficult to say anything seriously 
hampers economic growth in an economy whose real GNP rises 10 percent per 
year for year after year, and where recessions are considered in terms of 
annual growth rates of only 3 or 4 or 5 percent. Beyond that, there is no 
1Except for management malfeasance, in Hhich case the firm is still 
saved by its creditors. 
2
The determination, and success, of the Bank·of Japan is shown in 
its handling of the de facto bankruptcy of Japan's fourth largest security 
dealer, which found itself with a net worth of about minus $40 million in 
1965 when it bought stocks and expanded offices in expectation of stock 
price rises, when in fact they declined. The Bank of Japan financed 
continued operation and reorganization under new management with no losses 
to customers. The reorganized company, still Japan's fourth largest 
security house, has been able to anticipate loan repayments from high 
profits in the 1968-1969 stock market boom. 
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on 
saving rate, or even on the realized investment rate. The large firms that 
normally would be able to issue stock and bonds in free capital markets 
have had preferred access to loans. Perhaps the most serious adverse impact 
has been on smaller firms which would like to raise funds through the capi­
tal market, but probably the allocative effect has not been all that great. 
Presumably investment allocation would have been somewhat more efficient 
if funds had been rationed by interest rates in free markets, but Japan's 
high growth performance--and success in financin8 rapidly growing, innova­
tive, firms--suggest that the efficiency loss has not been substantial. 
In welfare terms there has been some cost in having the sort of finan­
cial system of which Japan's capital markets are symbolic. Semi-control 
over financial markets has favored plant and equipment investment over 
housing and durable goods consumption, favored large business firms over 
small, large financial institutions over small, and investors over indi­
vidual savers who hold their assets in time deposits, insurance and the 
like. Yet those who have borne these costs have been hurt relatively, not 
absolutely; with 10 percent growth, widely distributed, everyone is doing 
well in Japan. They are not greatly m-rnre of the potential opportunities 
foregone. And they are much less organized than big business and by finance 
to put pressure on the government. 
The greatest cost, in my subjective, foreign eyes, of Japan's present 
financial system is political, not economic. The system perpetuates and 
enhances the power of big business, large financial institutions, and the 
central government bureaucracy with which it deals, in the total society 
evidence that underdeveloped capital markets have had any adverse effect 
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of Japan. There are mitigations. So far this power structure has produced 
the goods, and dispersed them to all Japanese. Horeover, there is no mono­
lithic establishment; Japan well blends cooperation and competition, and 
members of the elite meritocracy frequently compete with each other over 
specific issues and goals. 
Returning to the more narrow topic of this essay, what prospects are 
there for the future expansion of the role of Japan's capital markets? 
The development of a real, vigorous bond market of substantial size 
can occur only when bonds are made an attractive financial asset for indi­
vidual and institutional holders of wealth, i.e., when yields on both new 
issues and outstanding bonds are determined by the interplay of supply and 
demand in free markets. I am skeptical that this will be soon achieved. 
The vested interests in government and finance are probably too great to 
bring about quickly the sweeping changes in the entire financial system that 
are implied in the freeing of interest rates on bonds. I foresee a con­
tinued period of slow groping trn-rnrd reduction of the differentials between 
new and old bond yields--a slight increase in issue interest rates, Bank 
of Japan support of certain bond markets, etc.--but reliance mainly on the 
vague hope that somehm-1 as the economy continues to grow interest rates 
will gradually come down of their mm accord. 
Prospects look somewhat better for the grouth of stock issuance. In 
recent months several smaller, aggressive firms with outstanding growth 
performance have successfully issued through public subscription new shares 
at close to market value, as have several large firms. Often this has been 
done by share issue in foreign (European or American) markets. Indeed a 
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strange kind of intermediation has developed, and may become significant, 
in which Japanese firms make new issues at market value to foreign investors, 
who then return the shares to the Tokyo market for sale to Japanese inves­
tors as soon as the domestic price of the shares rises. Thus it is estimated 
that almost 8 percent of c_orporate funds from stock issue in 1969 will come 
1from issuance at market, and that the rate will approach 15 percent in 1970. 
If the rigidity of the system of issuance at par is successfully breached, 
and it probably Hill be increasingly, then stocT: issue could well become an 
extremely important source of funds for Japanese corporations. 
1Nihon Keizai Shimbun, International Heekly Edition, November 25, 
1969, p. 1 
